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Red meat takes years off of cow’s life1
American political scientist Timothy Pachirat’s recent book, Every Twelve 
Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight (2011), begins 
with death.
In 2004, six cattle escaped from the holding pen of an industri-
alized slaughterhouse in Omaha, Nebraska. According to the 
Omaha World Herald, which featured the story on its front 
page, four of the six cattle made an immediate run for the park-
ing lot of nearby Saint Francis of Assisi Catholic Church, where 




Thou wast not born for death, immortal Bird!
No hungry generations tread thee down.
John Keats 
“Ode to a Nightingale”
1 Just to be safe, I should point out that The Onion, from which I quote this news 
article headline, is a satirical newspaper.
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A fifth animal trotted down a main boulevard to the railroad 
yards that used to service Omaha’s once-booming stockyards. 
The sixth, a cream-colored cow, accompanied the fifth animal 
partway before turning into an alleyway leading to another 
slaughterhouse. (1) 
As you can probably guess, for the sixth cow—as for the five others—things 
end badly. In the alleyway leading to the second slaughterhouse, police 
shoot it multiple times with a shotgun, and then it dies. I borrow this story, 
and so also begin with death, because it is the most economic way I can 
think of to announce my opening point: being killed is a defining predica-
ment of animals labouring in the commercial agricultural industry. Pachi-
rat’s rendering of the story makes this point so efficiently and pointedly, 
and in a manner not a little reminiscent of Kafka,2 in part simply because, 
while the cows attempt to escape their institutional fate of being killed, 
their efforts are in every case futile. The details of the futility underscore 
the point. For instance, the irony of the fact that four of the cows effectively 
seek, but fail to find, sanctuary in the parking lot of a church dedicated to 
the Catholic patron saint of animals, and the images of the other two cows 
wandering through an urban space, the construction and architecture of 
which suggests that although they may have left one slaughterhouse, the 
building apparently has no outside. 
Companion animals, feral animals, and wild animals die in a variety of 
ways. Some are killed by humans, some are killed by other animals, some 
die of old age, disease, accident, and so on. The deaths of agricultural ani-
mals, however, almost always take the form of being killed. For such animal 
labourers as beef cattle, domesticated pigs, and turkeys, as well as dairy 
cows, breeding sows (female pigs), and egg-laying hens, the horizon of life 
is not the multifarious forms of death that snare all mortal creatures. It is 
a specific form of dying. This unique situation is accentuated by the fact 
that nearly all such animals die in mechanized facilities in which massacre 
and bureaucracy converge, facilities that have been called “machines for 
dying in,”3 facilities designed solely for the purpose of killing animals and, 
2 Pachirat’s story is reminiscent of a particular Kafka story, namely “A Little Fable,” 
in which a mouse observes, “there in the corner stands the trap that I must run 
into,” to which a cat responds, “You only need to change your direction,” before 
eating the mouse (257). What’s really Kafkaesque about the story, however, is 
that the animal protagonists are, as Maurice Blanchot argues so many of Kafka’s 
protagonists are, effectively suspended between life and death.
3 In her introduction to Meat, Modernity, and the Rise of the Slaughterhouse, 
Paula Young Lee coins the phrase by way of an arch reference to Le Corbusier’s 
description of a house as “a machine for living in.” 
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afterwards, disarticulating their bodies into portions to be packaged and 
sold as, for the most part, food for human beings.
To be sure, the sixth cow is killed at but not in such a facility and indeed 
is part of a gang of cows that defer being killed through an escape, albeit 
a temporary one.4 There are, moreover, a number of cases of animals 
that successfully elude the institutionalized process of being killed that is 
devised especially for them. In May 2011, for instance, a six-year-old dairy 
cow called Yvonne, and slated to be transported to the slaughterhouse, 
escaped from a farm near the town of Mühldorf in Bavaria, Germany, and 
spent three months on the run before she was recaptured and bought by an 
animal sanctuary. Indeed, one could even go so far as to say that Yvonne’s 
adventure occasioned, as such stories routinely do, something like the 
“wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm” that Immanuel 
Kant affirmed as the proper affective response of contemporary spectators 
of the French Revolution (“An Old Question Raised Again” 143–48). The 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, for instance, called her “a sort of freedom fighter for 
the animal-loving republic” (so etwas wie einer Freiheitsheldin für die tierli-
ebe Republik) (Heidenreich). However, just as Kant ultimately denied those 
subject to a sovereign power the right to revolution (“Towards Perpetual 
Peace”), so the affective thrill over agricultural animal escapades exhibited 
in the news article takes as its condition of possibility resignation to an 
institutionalized capture of animal life so regularized it seems inexorable, 
part of the order of things. More generally, the kind of affect on display 
in this new story almost never turns into an ethico-political contention 
that in any way questions if the fate designed for agricultural animals is 
just.5 The number of agricultural animals killed as they are intended to be 
simply dwarfs the number of those that go on any escapade, let alone those 
who successfully escape being killed. Regardless of whether agricultural 
animals die by being efficiently processed by professional slaughterhouse 
workers or die in a more ad hoc manner, say, by being shot by police in 
the alleyway leading to a slaughterhouse, I think no one, with perhaps the 
exception of the animals themselves, really finds it a surprise that the dying 
of agricultural animals with very few exceptions takes one specific form, 
4 The non-instituted manner of the cow’s being killed is of key importance for 
Pachirat, who retells the story. He suggests that it is the unplanned, anomalous 
nature of the animal’s being killed that occasions in spectating workers at the 
slaughterhouse the indignant affective response they normally do not experience 
during their regular work killing animals and disarticulating their dead bodies.
5 For an incisive discussion of agricultural animal escapes, see Robert McKay.
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that of being killed.6 In a way, Martin Heidegger was, at least with regards 
to the world of industrialized agriculture, spot on when he said, in Being 
and Time, that animals do not properly speaking “die” but not quite right 
when he said they merely “perish” (46–53).7 The truth is they are killed.
Pachirat’s story is the perfect opening to his book’s broad central and 
convincing claim that what goes on in industrial slaughterhouses is only 
possible because of the institutional organization of the sensory percep-
tion, affective responses, and critical thinking of both off-site consumers 
of the slaughterhouse’s products and its on-site workers. “An examina-
tion of the everyday realities of contemporary slaughterhouse work,” he 
contends, “illuminates not only the ways in which the slaughterhouse is 
overtly segregated from society as a whole, but—paradoxically and per-
haps more importantly—how the work of killing is hidden even from 
those who participate directly in it” (8–9). To more fully explain how 
the mass killing of agricultural animals is made acceptable, however, we 
need to move beyond the scenography of the slaughterhouse so as to also 
take into account the conditions of possibility in place before animals get 
to the machines for dying. Hannah Arendt indicates a way of gaining a 
broader perspective when, in the penultimate chapter of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, she writes, “The insane mass manufacture of corpses is 
preceded by the historically and politically intelligible preparation of living 
corpses” (447). This essay seeks to take seriously Arendt’s suggestion that 
mass slaughter is a productive, and not simply a destructive, process, espe-
cially her suggestion that those who are destined to be transformed into 
corpses need to be produced, from the beginning, as so destined. What I 
find interesting about modern industrial agriculture is that it exercises not 
just the awesome power to take life but also the perhaps more awesome 
power to make life by actively prosecuting birth through the practice of 
mass breeding. Agricultural animals are made to live and made to make 
live. This is in no way to suggest that the industry makes up for or undoes 
what happens in the slaughterhouse. For what is truly interesting is that, 
6 To be sure, the discomfort or shock experienced by many people when invited to 
think about killing animals in slaughterhouses—even their resistance to thinking 
about such killing (and to thinking about their resistance to such thinking)—is 
evidence of a sort of surprise. But this just makes our experience of industrial-
ized animal killing a good example of ideological disavowal (“I know very well, 
but …”). My point is less about our perception of animal killing than about the 
fact that, regardless of our perception of it, it happens.
7 I am deliberately abusing Heidegger’s terms here so as to point out that the 
deaths of animal labourers in the modern agricultural industry are not simply 
a biological exigency but a biopolitical one.
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as Arendt’s metaphor of “living corpses” indicates, those who are prepared 
for slaughter are, prior to slaughter, somehow already dead. That is, the 
life that they nevertheless live exists before slaughter but after an earlier 
form of death. In the case of industrial agriculture, my argument will be 
that before animals are massacred in slaughterhouses, their life is marked 
by a form of dying that is indistinguishable from their being born. While 
agriculture wants them to be born, it does not want them to live. Once 
we take into account the mass breeding of animals as well as their mass 
slaughter, industrial agriculture comes into focus as a biopolitical project 
in which it becomes as difficult as it is urgent to say exactly when the life 
that begins with birth ends in death.
The Work of Birth
Looked at from the point of view of the animals employed at food pro-
duction facilities, agriculture appears to be little more than a massive 
enterprise of killing. The more common-sense point of view, however, is 
that the ultimate meaning of animal agriculture is not death but life.8 And 
indeed, as the practice of rearing livestock and producing such foodstuffs 
as milk and eggs, animal agriculture is an exemplary form of what Arendt, 
in The Human Condition, terms “labour,” something to be distinguished 
from “work.” Whereas work is activity that engenders the human-made 
world of artifacts—cars, buildings, appliances, hydro-electric dams, novels, 
jewelry, and so on—labour is an activity that provides for the biological 
life of human beings. “Labor,” claims Arendt, “ensures not only individual 
survival, but the life of the species” (8); “it never ‘produces’ anything but 
life” (88). Given that the vast majority of products that agriculture pro-
duces are forms of food, it is, like other forms of labour such as medicine, a 
form of activity that quite directly sustains the conditions for life itself. The 
American classic rock musician Ted Nugent and his wife Shemane Nugent 
put it succinctly in their book Kill It and Grill It: A Guide to Preparing and 
8 This is how Elizabeth Costello describes the view of animal agriculture she 
critiques in The Lives of Animals: 
And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treb-
linka was so to speak a metaphysical enterprise dedicated to noth-
ing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately 
devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn 
them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and 
refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the 
comfort of our homes) is as little consolation to those victims as 
it would have been—pardon the tastelessness of the following—to 
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difficult as it is 
urgent to say 
exactly when the 
life that begins 
with birth ends 
in death.
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Cooking Wild Game and Fish when they write, “meat is life!” (181).9 Of 
course, the syntactic minimalism and copulative certainty of this state-
ment, along with the all capital letters and the exclamation point, try a little 
too hard to efface any sense that, as English pop singer Morrissey once 
put it, “Meat is murder.”10 And it does have to be admitted that the “life” 
that meat “is” is not that of the meat itself or that formerly living creature 
which became the “meat.” Nevertheless, even though animal agriculture 
necessarily requires killing animals, the meat (and other food) that animals 
become once they are dead nourishes, in a very material way, human life. 
Of course, it is this very logic by which killing produces life that makes 
the animal agricultural industry such a textbook case of what Michel Fou-
cault called the “death-function” of biopolitics (“Society Must Be Defended” 
258). In his seminal account of biopolitics in the mid 1970s, Foucault con-
trasted biopower, the power to “make live,” with sovereign power, “the right 
to kill”  (241). As Foucault himself well knew, however, if the power to make 
live has proven proficient at making anything over the last two centuries, 
it is a pretty impressive number of dead bodies. A significant amount of 
work within biopolitical theory since Foucault has been preoccupied with 
explaining the ways in which the project of making live is also a project 
of making die, how biopolitics is also thanatopolitics or necropolitics.11 
Foucault’s own elegant explanation is that biopolitical power, in execut-
ing its project to make live, first, projects onto the living in general under 
its management a hierarchical opposition between two sorts of living 
beings: those that must live and those that must die, and second, estab-
lishes between them a biologistic notion of sacrifice whereby the killing of 
the latter increases the vitality of the former. Once this structure is in place, 
acts of making die can contribute to a project of making live because they 
are directed at a particular part of the population whose best contribution 
to the life of society may very well be dying. Applying this model to the 
specific case of animal agriculture is simple. Agriculture’s official objective 
is to provide food. As the motto for the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the un says, fiat panis (“let there be bread”). And with the moderniza-
fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses 
with. (22)
9 To be fair to the Nugents, the kind of meat they specify “is” life belongs to wild 
animals and not to agricultural animals.
10 “Meat is Murder” is the title of a 1985 album, and a song on that album, by the 
band The Smiths, for which Morrissey provided the voice and lyrics. 
11 Giorgio Agamben uses the term thanatopolitics in Homo Sacer, while necrop-
olitics comes from Achilles Mbembe’s “Necropolitics.”
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tion of production techniques beginning in the eighteenth century, animal 
agriculture has exemplified the biopolitical project of making live in a 
remarkably successful way. The production of food for human beings to 
eat turns, of course, upon a presupposed opposition between the human 
and the animal parts of the population. This opposition might seem given 
in the nature of things, merely a function of biological taxonomy. But 
without even taking into account the consequences of Jacques Derrida’s 
point that the very category of “the animal,” as something to be opposed 
to “the human,” is about as unnatural and empirically inaccurate a con-
cept as there ever existed (129–34), it does not take much to see that the 
subdivision of all living creatures into two groups is biopolitical precisely 
to the extent that it is confused with a distinction between those with a 
fundamental right to life and those whose right to life, if they have one, is 
every time trumped by that of the former group. To say this might seem 
an affront to common sense, but it is merely to restate two assumptions 
that subtend agriculture: the decision to externalize the lethal costs of its 
activities onto animals and the fantasy of sublation that turns these costs, 
via a sacrificial logic, into human life. Like all living creatures, humans 
surely have both a need, and, yes, even a right, to eat, and to eat well, but 
reducing the living in general to two categories of things, distributing life 
and death along that distinction, and then acting as if death can magi-
cally turn into life is hardly a necessity. Nor, it must be said, does it seem 
particularly just. It is a biopolitical exigency.
To describe animal agriculture as an unambiguous instance of the 
death-function of biopolitics, as I have been doing, captures something 
that, I think, very few people would bother denying. However, even as it 
is not wrong, neither is it wholly satisfactory, for it ignores what is really 
interesting about the industry’s management of animal life. Consider that 
Foucault grounds his account of the biopolitical justification for taking life 
in the example of a racism that hallucinates one part of the population as 
not so much an “enemy” as a “threat” to the other (a threat being a menace 
but not an adversary) (“Society Must Be Defended” 255–56). No matter how 
one looks at them, agricultural animals are not threats to human beings. 
The only time in which the latter can feel true is when pathogens amongst 
domestic animal populations jump the species boundary and infect human 
beings. As Cary Wolfe notes, when zoonotic pathogens, including those 
resistant to antibiotics, are seen to “pose a risk to national biosecurity, 
the results are depressingly familiar”: for example, “millions of chickens, 
turkeys, and ducks killed worldwide—80 million alone in Southeast Asia, 
19 million more in Canada—to combat h5n1 avian influenza in the spring 
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of 2004” (49). However, what is key here, and what Wolfe does not explic-
itly point out in his analysis, is that the “depopulation” of animals, as the 
official term puts it, aims not at the animals themselves but at the patho-
gens they carry, diseases which also threaten them, the animals. This is 
hardly the logic of the “threat” Foucault talks about, because animals are 
strictly speaking only hosts to the real threat to human beings, and the 
whole point of emergency “depopulations” is to protect not just human 
beings but also the animal population itself. If animals themselves were 
biological threats, then we would certainly kill them, but we would not 
reproduce them again! 
We can further dilate this wrinkle in the application of Foucault’s model 
of the death-function of biopolitics. Foucault himself well appreciated 
that it is possible for the death-function, once set in motion, to authorize 
the massacre of the very population it is supposed to protect. The Nazi 
state, for instance, aimed to protect the biological existence of its popula-
tion more rigorously than any state had before. At the same time, it was 
extremely liberal with its exercise of sovereign power’s right to take life, 
and not just toward those it deemed non-German, such as Jews, but also, 
in the end, toward true-blooded Germans. This possibility was, Foucault 
argues, built into the Nazi biopolitical project from the beginning: 
The destruction of other races was one aspect of the [Nazi] 
project, the other being to expose its own race to the absolute 
and universal threat of death.… Exposing the entire popula-
tion to universal death was the only way it could truly con-
stitute itself as a superior race and bring about its definitive 
regeneration once other races has been either exterminated 
or enslaved forever.
The Nazi state was, thus, not just “murderous” but also “suicidal,” and the 
result was not just the Final Solution but also “Telegram 71, in which, in 
April 1945, Hitler gave the order to destroy the German people’s own living 
conditions” (“Society Must Be Defended” 259–60). 
In terms of the logic authorizing the exercise of the right to kill, the 
main difference between what happened in Nazi Germany and modern 
animal agriculture is that whereas Nazism tried to make the German 
people live by killing Jews, only to end up trying to kill the German people, 
agriculture undertakes to make human beings live by killing animals but, 
in order to do so, puts a lot of effort into making animals live. Not only 
are agricultural animals not threats to be exterminated; they are, in the 
practice of husbandry, actively bred into existence. As much as the agri-
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cultural industry makes animals die, it also makes them live, and liter-
ally so, by breeding them, the very population that it also kills. Just as 
animals employed in the agricultural industry do not simply die, but are 
systematically killed, so we must say that they are not simply born, but 
are systematically bred. That is to say, neither cattle nor pigs nor poultry 
reproduce in a way that could fairly be described as spontaneous. Ever 
since animals were domesticated some twelve thousand years ago—and 
the first domesticated species was the dog—their reproduction can be said 
to have been influenced by human beings, even if unintentionally. Over 
the last two hundred years or so, as I will detail shortly, human regulation 
of animal sexual reproduction has become much more controlled and 
consequential to the point that agricultural practices regulate the births 
of animals as efficiently as their dying. Agriculture is as much an exercise 
in the highly organized mass breeding of animals as it is an exercise in the 
highly organized mass killing of animals. If industrial agriculture were sim-
ply a thanatopolitical exercise in the mass killing of animals for the benefit 
of humans, it would be a short-lived enterprise. Modern slaughterhouses, 
with their high capacity, high efficiency kill rates, would make short work 
of all existing agricultural animals. Out of necessity, if nothing else, the 
agricultural industry must be, for want of a better word, pro-life, and the 
life it sustains, cares for, and fosters is not just human but also animal. Ted 
Nugent, yet again, expresses the point in his paradox-accentuating clipped 
style with some ironic advice to environmentalists concerned about the 
extinction of wild animal species: “If you want to save a species, simply 
decide to eat it. Then it will be managed—like chickens, like turkeys, like 
deer, like Canadian geese” (“I have the American Dream licked”). The 
agricultural industry’s logic is, we could say, the reverse: because it wants 
to kill animals, and so produce the food that sustains human life, it has to 
call animals into existence. The result, however, is the same. Every animal 
labourer the industry kills is one it has already bred. And for every one it 
kills, it breeds another.
In fact, it is more accurate to say that for every animal it kills, the indus-
try breeds more than one new animal. Take poultry, which are globally the 
most populous type of domesticated animal. In 1961 the world domes-
ticated chicken population was almost four billion. Now it is nineteen 
billion. The dramatic increase at a rate that is historically unprecedented 
is not unrelated, of course, to a similar increase in the human popula-
tion over the same period, from just over three billion to almost seven 
billion. Yet as these numbers indicate, the agricultural animal popula-
tion is not just far greater than the human population; it is growing at a 
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rate considerably larger than that of the human population. By the year 
2050, moreover, the human population is projected to increase to over 
nine billion. In that same period the global demand for meat and dairy 
products is projected to double largely because of the westernization of 
diets in so-called developing countries. The increase in the agricultural 
animal population this necessitates—largely thanks to the introduction 
of industrialized factory farm production techniques into said nations—
will far outstrip the increase of the global human population. In sum, the 
already vast population of animals managed by the industrial agricultural 
industry is growing vaster at a rate that is itself accelerating (“Counting 
Chickens”). Insofar as the reproduction of agricultural animals through 
birth is regulated in such a way that, over time, more animals are born 
than are killed, we can say that industrial animal agriculture is, even as 
regards the animals themselves that it kills, more a project of making live 
than it is a project of making die. 
Such a situation constitutes, I suggest, an oddity for accounts of the 
death-function of biopolitics offered by Foucault and theorists who have 
followed him. Consider that Roberto Esposito opens Bios: Biopolitics and 
Philosophy with five examples, drawn from the contemporary period, of 
the “double tendency” of power to simultaneously, in the same gesture, 
to make live and to kill. “It is,” he writes, “exactly the same paradox that 
Michel Foucault, in a series of writings dating back to the middle of the 
1970s, examined. Why does a politics of life always risk being reversed 
into a work of death?” (7–8). We will return to one of Esposito’s examples 
of this paradox below, but for now I think we can see that insofar as the 
mass breeding of animals is a constitutive feature of industrial agriculture, 
then what the husbandry-slaughtering complex presents is a paradox that 
is a bit more complicated than that which Esposito identifies. For while 
agriculture is undoubtedly a politics of life that proceeds as a work of death, 
it also proceeds as what we can call a work of birth. And as we shall see, 
the real perplexity lies in the fact that the work of birth and the work of 
death are indistinguishable. 
The Death of Birth
To examine the work of birth as organized by the husbandry industry, 
let’s think briefly about the relation between birth and death structuring 
the predicament of animal species that face extinction. It is well known 
that agricultural production is one of the leading causes of environmen-
tal degradation. According to the widely read 2010 report by the United 
Nations Environmental Programme, Assessing the Environmental Impacts 
The real 
perplexity lies in 
the fact that the 
work of birth 
and the work of 
death are indis-
tinguishable.
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of Production and Consumption, “Agricultural production accounts for 
a staggering 70% of the global freshwater consumption, 38% of the total 
land use, and 14% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions” (2). The same 
study also highlights the particular impact of animal agriculture, which, no 
matter how industrialized, “is and will remain an inefficient transforma-
tion process compared to most industrial processes”: “Animal products, 
both meat and dairy, in general require more resources and cause higher 
emissions than plant-based alternatives.” Looking to the future, it says, “A 
substantial reduction of impacts would only be possible with a substantial 
worldwide diet change, away from animal products” (75, 79, 82). Another 
fact, one hidden in even such statements, emerges when we frame the 
environmental impact of animal agriculture in terms of animal population 
sizes: the extraordinary expansion, over the last decades, of the size of 
already vast standing agricultural animal populations has produced a cor-
responding decrease in wild animal populations. According to the World 
Wildlife Fund’s 2012 Living Planet Index Report, between 1970 and 2008, 
exactly the same period over which the global agricultural animal popu-
lation began to boom, the world’s non-domesticated animal populations, 
including birds and fish, declined by an average of 30 percent. In many 
cases entire species have already gone extinct or face imminent extinc-
tion. Many biologists agree that we are living through the sixth great mass 
extinction of life forms in the history of the planet and that many of these 
extinctions that have occurred in the last two hundred years are directly 
or indirectly, and even if unintentionally, anthropogenic. In his 2002 book 
The Future of Life, E. O. Wilson, the biologist well known equally for his 
inventing sociobiology and for his vigorous environmentalism, posited 
that if the current rate of biodiversity loss continues unabated, one half 
of the planet’s higher life forms will be extinct by 2100 (23). 
Beyond rehearsing what everyone already knows about the loss of bio-
diversity, however, I want to see what we can learn from one phrase some-
times used to describe species extinction: “the death of birth,” a phrase 
widely said to originate with Wilson, although I have not been able to 
track it down in his writings—something perhaps appropriate given that 
the phrase signifies effacement of origins.12 In the popular 2003 docu-
mentary The Corporation, ceo-turned-ecologist Ray Anderson recounts 
his experience of being struck by the phrase while reading Paul Hawken’s 
The Ecology of Commerce: “very quickly into that book I found the phrase, 
12 A similar phrase appears in Michael Soulé and Brian Wilcox’s Conservation 
Biology: An Evolutionary-Ecological Perspective: “Death is one thing. An end 
of birth is something else” (8).
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‘the death of birth.’ It was E. O. Wilson’s expression for species extinction, 
‘the death of birth,’ and it was a point of a spear into my chest, and I read 
on, and the spear went deeper, and it became an epiphanal experience, 
a total change of mindset for myself and a change of paradigm” (37). As 
Anderson’s account of reading suggests, “the death of birth” has a painful 
poignancy that “species extinction” does not. I encountered this myself 
when, during a lecture Wilson gave on biodiversity at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison in January 2006, I, too, had a near-death reading 
experience. Projecting a colour photograph of a male golden toad (Bufo 
periglenes), a member of a species indigenous to high-altitude tropical 
forests in Costa Rica, he explained that the last time a living specimen of 
this species was seen was in on 15 May 1989, and the species has since been 
declared extinct by the International Union for Conservation of Nature. I 
remember being sharply moved, as if physically punched, when he called 
species extinction “the death of birth” and explained that not only is this 
particular toad dead, but no more individuals of this species will ever be 
born in the future. 
The pathos that colours attempts to read “the death of birth” registers 
the way the phrase describes species extinction not as an empirical phe-
nomenon but as an ontological event. A species is often said to become 
extinct when the last member of that species, the one who has survived 
the deaths of all conspecifics, dies. Through a synecdochal identification 
of part and whole, the death of the specimen is the death of the popula-
tion. And indeed, there can be something deeply poignant about images 
of the last surviving individuals, such as the famous black-and-white film 
footage, shot in 1933, of the last Tasmanian Tiger, aimlessly pacing back 
and forth in a cage. But what is any such last surviving individual really a 
specimen of? If from the moment it is the last, can its singular existence 
be said, in all rigour, to have the exemplarity of a specimen of a species? 
The concept of a species as a population that can successfully reproduce, 
dominant since biologist Ernst Mayr’s formulation, suggests that a species 
actually becomes extinct when a population is no longer reproductively 
viable: not when a death, the last death, happens, but when birth does 
not happen, is no longer able to happen. Species extinction is less about 
death happening than it is about birth not happening, or not happening 
as much as death happens. Indeed, whatever the particular circumstances 
and causal factors at work, a species goes extinct when its birthrate is less 
than its mortality rate. As Children of Men -type scenarios demonstrate, it 
is possible for a species to go extinct without any increase in the mortality 
rate, even without any killing, as opposed to dying, taking place. Hence 
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biologists refer to species where several members are still alive but are, 
for various reasons, incapable of reproducing, as “functionally extinct” 
(Wilson 37). What renders “the death of birth” a conceit, or extravagant 
figure of speech, worthy of the renaissance English metaphysical poets, is 
that it precisely emphasizes that a species goes extinct not when the last 
individual member of that species departs the world by dying but when 
the act of entering into the world by birth itself departs the world. Col-
lapsing the distance separating the modes by which mortals enter into the 
world and depart from it, it sends the light of natality into the darkness of 
mortality, thus closing the openness of coming-into-being. The paradox 
is so sharp because what comes to an end is not just a thing but the gen-
erative iterability that makes this thing possible in the first place. It is not 
that the species disappears but that its mode of appearance disappears, 
not that something ends but that what ends is beginning itself, not that 
life dies but that birth dies. 
Making Live
If endangered animal species face the ontological predicament of the 
death of birth, then how do we describe the predicament faced by animal 
populations held in agricultural production facilities? The answer lies in 
what we can call the “birth-function” of biopolitics. While species facing 
extinction have no future, this is a problem that agricultural animals will 
never face, so long as something like current conditions of production per-
sist. Indeed, their problem is that they have a guaranteed future, perhaps 
too much future. Clearly this is not because of enforced legal or norma-
tive interdictions on killing individual agricultural animals. Members of 
non-agricultural threatened species are (at least in theory) so protected, 
but the killing of agricultural animals is, as we have seen, an efficiently 
organized affair that happens on a massive scale: domesticated cows, pigs, 
and poultry die in numbers that easily outstrip, indeed dwarf, those of any 
threatened species. (Which makes one ask: Are agricultural animals not 
also “threatened”?) If agricultural animals have, nevertheless, such a cer-
tain future, it is because it is not just their deaths but also their births that 
are subject to careful biopolitical management. In fact, we could say that 
animal agriculture turns two important features of the ontology of living 
creatures to its advantage. On the one hand—and this is easy to grasp—it 
recognizes that that cows, pigs, and poultry, like all mortal creatures, leave 
the world by dying and can be made to die. Exploiting this fact, it kills 
them in great numbers. But it also knows full well that animals, like all 
natal creatures, enter the world by being born and can be made to be born. 
It is not that the 
species 
disappears but 
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Exploiting this fact, it breeds animals in numbers at least equally great. 
After all, the world’s most effective animal breeding programs are found 
not in the field of wildlife conservation but in the agricultural industry. 
This is odd to think, given that the animals bred are also the ones killed, 
but such breeding programs are, nevertheless, so well funded and so suc-
cessful that conservationist groups working to save dwindling populations 
of wild animal species can only marvel. 
It is at this point that we need to pay attention to an unremarked upon 
double meaning audible within Foucault’s description of biopower’s basic 
operation as the power to “make live” (faire vivre). To “make live” can 
mean to allow, enable, or empower to live, where the action of making 
organizes the conditions of possibility for living, all the while preserving 
the activity of the one who actually does the living. However, to “make live” 
can also be more coercive. To make live can have the effect of compelling 
or forcing the living to live. I think much work within biopolitical studies, 
that concerned with normalization, interprets this coerciveness to mean 
that power often makes human beings live in certain ways, according to 
particular models or standards. More radically, however, to make live in 
a coercive sense can also take the form of making something be alive in 
the first place, by being born.13 The practice of breeding that goes on in 
the wing of industrial agriculture known as husbandry is an example of 
the biopolitical project of making live in the latter sense. Manipulating 
reproductive capacities possessed by all living creatures, it refuses agri-
cultural animals the option to not be made to live.
Animal husbandry turns birth into a function of the biopolitical project 
to make live in two ways, for it makes animals make other animals live 
and it makes animals live. The first form of making live is most apparent 
in the way in which the process of conception is, in the case of many agri-
cultural animal species, so completely managed by technical interventions 
that animals themselves are not required, not permitted, or not able to 
sexually copulate. For most of the twelve-thousand-odd year history of 
animal domestication by human beings, any human influence on animal 
reproduction was slight and mostly unintentional. However, beginning 
with the modern Agricultural Revolution human beings have mediated 
the reproduction of animals in increasingly hands-on ways. In the 1760s 
Robert Blakewell of Dishley Farm in Leicester conducted influential 
experiments in selective breeding with sheep, cattle, and horses, most 
13 Foucault notes a similar ambiguity in the death-function of biopolitics: “When I 
say ‘killing’ [as in “the right to kill”], I obviously do not mean simply murder as 
such, but also every indirect form of murder” (“Society Must Be Defended” 256).
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notably in inbreeding (reproductive copulation within the same family) 
so as to increase the chances that offspring would inherit desired traits, 
in the case of cattle this being size, form, flesh, and fattening propensity 
(Carlson). While such recognizably modern husbandry practices trans-
formed the existence of animals as living creatures, they did, nonetheless, 
require animals to copulate in order to conceive. With the development 
of assisted reproduction technologies (arts) in the first half of twentieth 
century, however, the impregnation of female animals became possible 
without copulation. The rationalization of conception through arts was 
first achieved on a truly mass scale in the cattle industry in the United 
States during the 1970s. Ever since that time the conception of a dairy calf 
can involve a number of stages: 
1. the collection of semen from a carefully chosen breeding bull by 
means of a manually operated “artificial vagina” or by inserting elec-
trodes in a bull’s rectum to stimulate ejaculation; 
2. the extension, sex identification, and sorting of the semen; 
3. cryogenic freezing, and storage of the semen in semen tanks; 
4. the transportation of the semen via networks capable of stretching 
across nations, regions, and the globe; 
5. the thawing of the semen and artificial insemination of a cow of high 
genetic quality, in natural or artificially induced estrus, by means of a 
needleless syringe; 
6. the hormonally induced multiplication of eggs (superovulation) in 
cows; 
7. the flushing of the embryos from the cow; 
8. the cryogenic freezing the embryos; 
9. and the transfer of the embryos into the recipient herd of lower 
genetic quality in synchronized estrus—two embryos for each to 
enable twinning.14 
As is clear, the reproductive capacities of all animals involved is rational-
ized for efficiency. Without arts a bull can cover thirty to fifty cows per 
year. With the use of arts, the number of calves one bull can produce is 
fifty thousand (Clarke 160). Transfer of embryos to the herd of cows allows 
the high-quality cow to be re-impregnated again as soon as is desired and 
14 Adele E. Clarke discusses developments in the theory and practice of reproduc-
tion in the agricultural sciences and industry in Disciplining Reproduction: Mo-
dernity, American Life Sciences, and “the Problem of Sex” (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1998), 159–62.
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practical. “As in any other area of Fordist manufacture,” Melinda Cooper 
notes in Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal 
Era, “the aim of these procedures is to increase the production of rela-
tive surplus value (in milk and meat) by getting the most out of each unit 
time of reproductive labor. In line with the standard rules of assembly line 
production, animal reproductive science seeks to eliminate unproductive 
(or rather unreproductive) time,” the result being that “reproduction is 
reduced to production” (132–33).15 
It does not feel right to say that such assisted reproductive techniques 
require human beings to have coercive sex with animals or that modern 
agricultural husbandry amounts to a program of mass rape by proxy. How-
ever, it is remarkably suggestive that such techniques also do not require 
animals to physically copulate with each other and that any erotic plea-
sure necessary to get a bull to ejaculate into an artificial vagina is entirely 
co-ordinated by human beings. Indeed, in many cases the morphological 
oddities breeding techniques introduce render animals physically inca-
pable of successfully copulating. Given that one of the things the Ameri-
can Christian pro-life movement laments is sex without reproduction, it 
would be logical to think that the reproduction without sex involved in the 
artificial reproduction of agricultural animal life can, for them, only be a 
wet dream. Surely, at this point the difference between violently fucking 
animals and radically invasive forms of fucking with their fucking becomes 
a real question.
Breeding is, of course, a process directed at bringing more animals 
into existence. If the use of these breeding techniques to force animals to 
conceive is a first step in the process of making live, a final step is forcing 
animals to be born.16 The term “forced birth” has been used to describe 
a practice of compelling pregnant women to bring a fetus to term and 
deliver it. Forced birth can, for instance, describe the effects of pro-life 
15 The most recent development in agricultural husbandry is the combination 
of arts with techniques of selective breeding oriented by molecular biotech-
nologies of marker-assisted selection, genomic selection, transgenics (genetic 
modification), and cloning, although the mass implementation of such new 
technologies is unevenly developed across cattle, pigs, poultry, and other spe-
cies. For an in-depth discussion, see Richard Twine, Animals as Biotechnology.
16 Technically such animals as poultry and fish are hatched, not born. However, 
described from a biopolitical, as opposed to a purely physiological, point of view, 
differences between viviparous and oviparous ways of entering the world are 
less important. In what follows, I will, purely for stylistic purposes, use “birth” 
to refer to both parturition and the process of laying of fertilized eggs that then 
develop and hatch outside the body. 
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movements on women’s reproductive rights. Whether a woman becomes 
pregnant freely or forcibly, anti-abortion laws and norms can prevent her 
from securing an abortion even when she does not freely choose to give 
birth.17 I do not think that it detracts from our appreciation of the very real 
violence to which women are subjected to consider that “forced birth” also 
describes the manner in which female animals in the agricultural industry 
have no option but to perform the labour of birth necessary to bring other 
animals into existence. At the moment of this labour, such animals are 
made to make live. And more than this, the violence implicit in the phrase 
“forced birth” can also be directed toward those whom the birth makes live, 
namely, the animals who are born. While Penelope Deutscher points out 
that treatments of reproductive politics in biopolitical theory focus, for 
no good reason, on “fetal life” while ignoring “reproductive maternal life,” 
I do want to suggest that agricultural husbandry practices deny animals 
not just the option to give birth but also the option to not be born.
Of course, in saying that industrialized agriculture forces living crea-
tures to be born might seem to put the horse before the cart, or—perhaps 
more precisely—to put the horse before the horse, in the sense that it 
would seem to assume that an animal exists before it exists. This is one of 
Esposito’s criticisms of the French Appeals Court’s decision to recognize 
the right of a baby named Nicolas, born with serious genetic lesions, to 
sue the doctor who misdiagnosed a case of German measles in his preg-
nant mother. 
What appears to be the legally irresolvable object of contro-
versy in the entire incident is attributing to small Nicolas the 
right not to be born.… The difficulty is both of a logical and an 
ontological order. If it is also already problematic that a being 
can invoke his or her right not to be, it is even more difficult to 
think of a nonbeing (which is precisely who has not yet been 
born) that claims the right to remain as such, and therefore 
not to enter into the sphere of being. (3)
17 After several Republican Party candidates in the United States who during the 
2012 election cycle publically asserted that women do not have a right to an 
abortion, even in the case of rape, comedian Jon Stewart responded by sum-
ming up the logic at work in such statements: “If a women wants to have a child 
through ivf, she cannot. If she does not want to have a baby conceived during 
rape, she has to.” His comments explicitly characterize the pro-life position as 
a second form of coercion continuous with that of rape. For our purposes, they 
also highlight the fact that animals who do not expressly signal their desire to 
have offspring are, nonetheless, forced, through arts, to have them.
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In the case of animal agriculture, saying that something that does not 
exist is forced to exist is indeed a contradiction in terms. And yet it is 
surely a cop-out to say that animals who have not yet been born (or even 
conceived) cannot have anything done to them, including be made to be 
born. The question is political, not strictly metaphysical, and it is unde-
cidable if any subject pre-exists its subjection to a power to make live, for, 
as Judith Butler argues, the interpellative address of power is directed to 
subjects even as it calls them into life (2). Recognizing the ontological 
ambivalence of a referent that is the effect, and not simply the source, of 
the structure of reference allows us to see that subjection is productive 
of the subject, without effacing all the ways in which power is also, in the 
same gesture, deductive or subtractive. This holds, I suggest, even when 
the effect of power’s ambivalent interpellation is making live in the sense 
of forcing something to be born. Consider Adam’s apostrophe to God in 
John Milton’s Paradise Lost, famously excerpted by Mary Shelley on the 
title page of her novel Frankenstein: “Did I request thee, Maker, from my 
clay / To mould me Man, did I solicit thee / From darkness to promote 
me?” (x 743–45). Here Adam addresses to God a rhetorical question about 
if, before he was created, he addressed to God an appeal to be created. In 
all the prenatal activity by which agricultural husbandry industry, like any 
expectant author of population policy, prepares for the arrival of newborns, 
it simultaneously recognizes and denies that it is similarly addressed by 
animals. Indeed, all its prenatal preparations effectively say to animals 
who have not been born, “You may not not be born.”
Let me be clear that, in and of itself, this point has nothing to do with 
the welfare concerns over the quality of life made available to animals. 
Animals labouring for the agricultural industry are certainly forced to live 
in some pretty unpleasant places. Concentrated Animal Feeding Opera-
tions (cafos), for instance, force large numbers of animals—say, seven 
hundred or more dairy cows, one hundred and twenty-five thousand or 
more laying hens—in such inventively inhospitable conditions that we 
should not hesitate to call such life a “slow death,” Lauren Berlant’s term 
for a condition in which being worn out and living are indistinguishable. In 
addition, many animals, thrown by the powerful hand of biotechnological 
manipulation such as growth hormones, hurtle toward death at an acceler-
ated rate, one far beyond that of their domesticated ancestors or their wild 
species peers. For example, the lifespan of broiler chickens is standardized 
for maximum efficiency to six weeks, at which point, having reached what 
is called their “slaughter weight,” any more life would be surplus to the 
labour the industry requires them to perform. But both unsavoury living 
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conditions and not having enough life can characterize the existence of 
creatures only once they are alive. More fundamentally, animal labourers 
are, through mass breeding, made to live in the first place.
Birth Kills
The account of the mass breeding practices of modern agriculture I have 
been offering up to this point has served to contest the assumption, wide-
spread in the field of animal studies, that, as the introduction to the appo-
sitely titled essay collection Killing Animals puts it, killing is the “most 
extreme” and “ultimate expression of human power over animals” (4). 
However, the point of doing this has been to prepare us to deepen our 
appreciation of the genius with which the agricultural industry massacres 
animals. What happens in slaughterhouses is, to invoke Arendt’s phras-
ing, “the insane manufacture of corpses,” but this does not mean that what 
happens in husbandry practices is the opposite, the reasonable calling of 
living creatures into life. Rather, husbandry’s management of birth makes 
live creatures that will be killed because they are born already dead. Agri-
culture might say, “You may not not be born,” but that does not amount to 
saying, “You may live.” For husbandry inscribes onto the births of animals 
a death that anticipates their being killed in slaughterhouses.
In order to draw toward this conclusion, I want to offer a reading of 
an event that echoes the futile stories of animal escapes with which I 
began but this time in the explicit context of sovereignty and the law. Just 
before American Thanksgiving each year the National Turkey Federation 
of the United States presents a live turkey to the White House.18 The tra-
dition began in 1947, but at the presentation ceremony in 1989, George 
H. W. Bush did something new, something that all presidents ever since 
have followed suit in doing: he granted the turkey a presidential pardon. 
The pardoned turkeys have been permitted to live out the rest of their 
unnatural born lives at a number of places: first the unfortunately named 
agricultural park Frying Pan Park, then from 2005 to 2009 either Dis-
neyland or Disney World, and since 2010 Mount Washington, George 
Washington’s Virginia home.
Staged before the national news media, this encounter between the 
beast and the sovereign, which has become known as the Presidential 
Turkey Pardon, is a piece of public relations theater performed in the 
style of a black comedy. The following quip by Barack Obama in 2009 is 
18 Unofficially, two turkeys are presented, one being the official offering, the second 
being the understudy on hand in case the first gets sick or, as has happened, 
dies before the event.
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a good example of what I mean: “Thanks to the intervention of Malia and 
Sasha [his children]—because I was ready to eat this sucker—Courage [the 
name given to the turkey] will … be spared this terrible and delicious fate” 
(Slack). Here is an example of the gallows humour with which George 
W. Bush peppered his speech at the ceremony in 2005: “This is what we 
call—the White House is called the people’s house, and we’re going to call 
Marshmallow and Yam the people’s turkeys. They made it here through a 
democratic process. There was a nationwide election on the White House 
web site. In the end, the voters made the choice, and it was a close election. 
You might say it was neck and neck.”
One way of explaining what gives the humour of the Presidential Tur-
key Pardon its dark quality is the oblique evocation of the annual mass 
slaughter of turkeys that the president does not pardon—some forty-five 
million turkeys in the United States for Thanksgiving, according to the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Remember that the group that presents 
the turkey to the White House each year, the National Turkey Federation, 
is not, as its name might reasonably suggest, an organization representing 
the interests of turkeys. It is, as its website, www.eatturkey.com, puts it, a 
Washington, D.C.–based lobby group “providing services and conducting 
activities which increase demand for its members’ products”—its mem-
bers being businesses who breed, raise, and slaughter turkeys for profit. 
Moreover, up until 1989, the turkeys presented each year to the White 
House were never pardoned and almost always served up for dinner a 
few days later.
The performance of the Turkey Pardon in the genre of black comedy 
can also be explained as a function of the ambivalence of the act of par-
doning. To receive a pardon is, for the one being pardoned, undoubtedly a 
good thing. However, as an exemplary speech act of sovereignty, a pardon 
mobilizes the sovereign’s defining “right to kill.” In his performance of the 
role of the forgiving sovereign President Obama attributes his decision to 
save Courage the turkey to his daughters, thus deftly fulfilling the impera-
tive that the president be masculine, adult, and carnivorous, a supreme 
example of what Derrida calls the “carno-phallogo-centric” subject (“Eat-
ing Well”). Perhaps the best demonstration that the sovereign’s power to 
pardon, and thus allow to live, co-exists with a right to kill is a photograph 
showing President Gerald Ford standing over two turkeys placed side by 
side on a table, one living, the other dead.19 Whereas in a declaration of 
19 That the photograph is from the period when turkeys presented to the White 
House were not pardoned does not take away from the point here.
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a state of exception, the total situation of law is suspended, a pardon sus-
pends only its application on one thing. Nevertheless, the pardon is also 
an example of the sovereign’s ability to suspend law.
But the real source of the wrinkle that occasions the near absurdist 
dark humour of the Presidential Turkey Pardon, and the true oddness 
of the kind of pardon being offered, emerges only once we ask, What is 
the turkey being pardoned for? After all, to pardon is to forgive someone 
who has committed a crime and to annul the punishment that goes along 
with conviction. But in this case, everyone knows that no turkey, even the 
lucky one presented to the president, has committed or could commit a 
criminal action that we could forgive. Nevertheless, with one exception, 
turkeys are subject to the annual violence of systematic mass killing. If the 
mass slaughter of turkeys has no relation to anything that they have done, 
then the unavoidable conclusion is that it can only be a figural reflection 
of what they, like all agricultural animals, are. 
What these animals are is, moreover, outside the law in the sense that 
they are fundamentally rightless. In The Origins of Totalitarianism Hannah 
Arendt says of those she calls “the rightless,” “Their plight is not that they 
are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they 
are oppressed but that nobody wants to even oppress them” (295–96). To say 
that no law exists for agricultural animals might seem like an exaggeration. 
Are there not a number of laws that protect the lives of animals? While 
welfare laws do indeed exist, they are not only radically inconsistent, as 
Siobhan O’Sullivan has handsomely demonstrated, and even absent where 
most needed—in the United States agricultural animals are not among the 
animals protected by the Federal Animal Welfare Act—they do not, strictly 
speaking, exist for animals as subjects of legal rights. The obligation to obey 
animal welfare laws is owed to the state, not to animals. This is why animals 
do not have standing in the eyes of law, because the law does not recognize 
animals can be injured by any actions or laws. The position of animals with 
regard to the law is underscored when we considered whether or not, in 
their case, it is true, as Arendt says, “The best criterion by which to decide 
whether someone has been forced outside the pale of the law is to ask if 
he would benefit by committing a crime.… As criminal even a stateless 
person will not be treated worse than another criminal, that is, he will be 
treated like everybody else. Only as an offender against the law can he 
gain protection from it” (Origins 286). The fact that creatures whose mere 
existence is grounds for being killed, far from being assigned a lawyer to 
represent them in a court, where the accusation about ontology must be 
proven, is instead executed without a trial—indeed the fact that the whole 
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Presidential Turkey Pardon is a sham cannot be explained by saying that 
turkeys are by nature incapable of being recognized as persons before the 
law. Rather it demonstrates that turkeys, like all animals, are an example 
of what Foucault calls the “biocriminal” (“Society Must Be Defended” 258). 
How, he asks, does one justify capital punishment within a governmental 
paradigm where life is a fundamental value to be fostered? The answer is 
to “invoke less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the 
criminal, his incorrigibility, and the safeguard of society. One had the right 
to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others” (History 
of Sexuality 138). I have met some pretty nasty turkeys, but no one justifies 
killing them, or any agricultural animals, by appealing to their threatening 
nature. This does not mean, however, that we do not appeal to what they 
irremissibly, irredeemably are. As Cary Wolfe points out, the mass killing 
of animals is not genocide, in part because it does not aim to eliminate a 
group of living beings of a certain “biological constitution” (45). Rather, 
it happens for economic reasons. As Wolfe well understands, however, 
what happens to animals happens because their biological constitution is 
rendered as a death sentence. 
This is to say that its birth is a death sentence. The pardoned turkey’s 
crime is—along with all other turkeys—nothing more and nothing less 
than being born a turkey. In our earlier consideration of the phrase “the 
death of birth,” we read birth as that which dies. However, as with all 
genitive phrases, the subject and object can be reversed so as to read it as 
signifying that birth is something that kills. The death of birth means not 
just death over birth but also death by birth. How is this possible? Consider 
that the reproductivity of the maternal body, particularly the moment of 
birth, is central to the human rights imaginary. As the first article of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, “All human beings are born 
and remain equal in dignity and rights” (emphasis added). Industrial agri-
culture also treats animals as if they are born with an ethical or political 
significance. It is, however, an inverse one, for it breeds animals in such a 
way that they are born symbolically dead, equal in absolute rightlessness 
by which they bear the being killed as a birth right—a right to be killed 
possessed by humans. It is, after all, almost certain that the life animals 
begin by being bred will end by being killed. At least within the fantasy 
world of biopolitics, history, in the sense of contingency, has ended for 
such animals; they live in the time that remains. Hence, their birth is best 
thought of, not as a presencing but as an absencing or, more accurately, 
as a presencing that absents, as an arrival in the form of a departure, an 
addition that achieves a subtraction or a loss. In The Fall of Hyperion 
The death of 
birth means not 
just death over 
birth but also 
death by birth.
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John Keats compared the mortal Apollo’s rebirth as the god of poetry to 
a moment when 
  one who should take leave 
 Of pale immortal death, and with a pang
 As hot as death’s is chill, with fierce convulse
 Die into life (iii 127–30) 
Agricultural animals are, by contrast, those who are born into death. Not 
just born for death, as all mortals are, but born in such a way that the result 
is not life, but death. To put it sharply, industrialized agriculture organizes 
the births of animals in such a way as to make them a form of dying.
Let me conclude by turning to a passage that I suspect many readers 
may have had in mind while reading this essay. In The Animal That There-
fore I Am Derrida observes that in agriculture and elsewhere animal life 
is being destroyed on such a massive scale that it calls to be regarded as 
genocide. Yet he also says that the massacre of animal life, if it is a genocide, 
would be an odd kind of genocide:
[T]he annihilation of certain species is indeed in process, but 
it is occurring through the organization and exploitation of 
an artificial, infernal, virtually interminable survival, in condi-
tions that previous generations would have judged monstrous, 
outside of every presumed norm of a life proper to animals that 
are thus exterminated by means of their continued existence or 
overpopulation. As if, for example, instead of throwing a peo-
ple into ovens and gas chambers (let’s say Nazi) doctors and 
geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and 
overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by means of 
artificial insemination, so that, being continually more numer-
ous and better fed, they could be destined in always increasing 
numbers for the same hell, that of the imposition of genetic 
experimentation, or extermination by gas or fire. In the same 
abattoirs. (The Animal 26)
The first reason why the mass killing of animals does not look like genocide 
is that, as Cary Wolfe emphasizes in his reading of this passage, the acts of 
killing cannot amount to an extermination, because the acts of breeding 
that accompany them make the job of killing an infinite one. Extermination 
is just not extermination if it is deliberately interminable (45).20 The second 
20 Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello also voices the point about interminability: “Let 
me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, 
and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed 
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reason, one that evokes the argument I have been making, is that animals 
are killed not just through traditional means, such as slaughterhouses, but 
through the inventive one of a systematic program of breeding. I think 
Derrida overstates the case a bit when he implies that agriculture breeds 
animals “so that” it can kill them. Could one also not say it kills them so 
that it can breed them? The real point, and one that I think his hyperbole 
is calculated to make, is that in such circumstances it is incredibly difficult 
to distinguish an act of giving life from an act taking life. In this respect, 
agriculture would amount to an unusual program of genocide by forced 
birth. “Whereas the Nazis and all their imitators carried out genocide 
by preemptively destroying birth,” writes Esposito, “those of today do so 
through forced birth” (7).21 For instance, the rape of Tutsi women and 
girls by Hutu men and boys was intended to issue in children who were 
Hutu. Thus the Tutsi, whose lives were, from the point of view of the 
Hutu, not worth living, would be bred out of existence and replaced by 
Hutu children whose lives were worth living. The forced birth in animal 
agriculture is different, not just insofar as it does not involve any crossing 
of different populations but more importantly insofar as it is not intended 
to produce offspring whose lives are, unlike their mothers, worthy of liv-
ing. It is intended to produce living creatures whose lives are, exactly like 
their mothers, unworthy of living. Thus it is different from both Nazi and 
Hutu genocidal rape, which attempt to make live through the death of 
the certain parts of the population. In animal agriculture making live and 
making die converge in a more acute way, for these projects are exercised 
on the same population. As a spokesman for the Disney Company, at 
whose parks the turkeys pardoned by presidents between 2005 and 2009 
were sent to live, said in explaining why the turkeys died so quickly after 
arriving, “They’re not bred to live a long time. These turkeys are bred for 
Thanksgiving” (Greenwood).
 dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing 
rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of 
killing them” (22).
21 Catherine Mackinnon notes that the same strategy was also pursued in Bosnia-
Herzegovinia. In an unnerving present tense, she writes, “In genocide, it is 
more usual for the babies on the other side to be killed. Croatian and Muslim 
women are raped, and then denied abortions, to help make a Serbian state by 
making Serbian babies” (191).
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